Cancellation of bail when accused tempering with witnesses and also influencing the trial. There was a dispute between the two communities in regard to gaon sabha land. The upper caste has occupied land allotted to the victim's family in 1999. They are not willing to vacate the land therefore, a small group of villages moved a public interest litigation in the high court. In that PIL the high court directed the collector to submit a report within four weeks.
The collector vacated the land and also provided possession to the victim. After disposal of the PIL the other community assaulted and abused the victim. An FIR has been lodged against them under section 148/149/307 IPC and section 3(2) of SC ST Act. When the accused secured bail from the high court again threatening the victim. The court did not hear our voice. How to get cancellation of their bail.
Asked from: Bihar
In my considered opinion, it is a settled principle of law that once bail has been granted, it should not be cancelled in a routine or mechanical manner. Cancellation of bail is a serious matter and the higher court ordinarily interferes only when the order granting bail is found to be perverse, arbitrary, or passed without proper consideration of the relevant factors.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. (2004) 7 SCC 525 Neeru Yadav vs State of U.P. (2014) 16 SCC 508; Anil Kumar Yadav vs State NCT of Delhi (2018) 12 SCC 129; has observed that while granting bail the court must take into account certain important factors, such as:
- nature of the allegations against the accused,
- manner in which the offence is alleged to have been committed,
- gravity and seriousness of the offence,
- specific role attributed to the accused,
- criminal antecedents of the accused,
- likelihood of the accused influencing or tampering with witnesses.
Therefore, the first step is to carefully examine the bail order and see whether the court granting bail has considered these essential factors.
Another important aspect which requires examination is the compliance with the mandatory procedure provided under Section 15-A of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. This provision gives the victim a statutory right to be heard at the time of consideration of bail. The court granting bail is required to issue notice to the victim and provide an opportunity to participate in the bail proceedings.
If this mandatory procedure has not been followed, it can be a valid ground for seeking cancellation of bail. However, such a ground would generally arise where no notice of the bail proceedings was served upon the victim and the victim was deprived of the opportunity of being heard.
While considering an application for cancellation of bail, the appellate court may also take into account any subsequent circumstances that may have arisen after the grant of bail. The conduct of the accused after obtaining bail is also relevant, particularly if there are instances of threatening witnesses, attempting to influence them, or otherwise interfering with the course of justice.
In the circumstances mentioned by you, it would be advisable to approach the Hon’ble Supreme Court by filing an appropriate application for cancellation of bail. Since the victim belongs to a marginalized section of society and is socially weaker than the accused, any act of threatening or influencing witnesses may seriously affect the fairness of the trial. Such circumstances may constitute a reasonable ground for seeking cancellation of bail.
Related: Lapses in the investigation under SC/ST Act
Evidence of an interested witness is admissible or not in criminal proceedings. My husband is an accused in murder of his relative. There was some dispute regarding the property but he was not actually involved in the crime. He was present there but not participated in the crime. but he is arrayed as a prime offender. prosecution has produced only two witnesses in the case. One is the real son and another is an injured person.
The real son was not present at the scene but he later on reached there after coming to know about the offence. The witness deposed that there was a dispute between the accused and deceased, he immediately reached and saw that the accused were beating the deceased and hurling abuses, when I reached the accused flee. Due to injuries sustained by the deceased he died.
He deposed that both accused were beaten by the deceased. whereas my husband was only present there. please advise whether evidence of such an interested witness is reliable and admissible?
Asked from: Andhra Pradesh
It is a settled proposition of criminal jurisprudence that the testimony of a witness cannot be discarded merely on the ground that he is an interested witness. Rejection of evidence solely on this premise would amount to a failure of justice, as authoritatively held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Masalti v. State of U.P., AIR 1965 SC 202.
Ordinarily, an “interested witness” is understood to be one who has a direct or indirect stake in the outcome of the case. While close relatives of the victim—such as a son, daughter, husband, or wife—may be described as related witnesses, their presence at the scene of occurrence, particularly where the offence is committed within the confines of a house or private place, renders them natural witnesses. In such circumstances, their evidence cannot be discarded merely because of their relationship with the deceased.
In State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Rayappa and Others, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that it is a well-established principle of law that the testimony of a witness, if otherwise credible and trustworthy, cannot be rejected solely on the ground that he is related to the deceased and is, therefore, an interested witness.
In the present case, the son of the deceased cannot be termed an interested witness in the legal sense; he is a natural witness to the occurrence. The incident admittedly took place within the house of the deceased, and no independent person was present at the time of commission of the offence. A related witness does not ipso facto become an interested witness.
The distinction between a “related witness” and an “interested witness” has been lucidly explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Darya Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 328, wherein it was held that a related witness is not necessarily an interested witness. A witness can be said to be “interested” only when he or she derives some benefit from the outcome of the litigation—such as a decree in a civil suit or the conviction of an accused in a criminal trial.
Furthermore, in Satbir Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 2009 SC 2163, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it is not a sound principle of law that the prosecution case must fail merely because the witnesses examined are not independent. The absence of independent witnesses, by itself, is not a ground to discard otherwise reliable evidence.
It is now a well settled principle of law that only because the witnesses are not independent ones may not by itself be a ground to discard the prosecution case. If the prosecution case has been supported by the witnesses and no cogent reason has been shown to discredit their statements, a judgment of conviction can certainly be based thereupon.
In view of the aforesaid judicial pronouncements, it is evident that the testimony of related witnesses is legally admissible and can form the basis of conviction, provided it inspires confidence and is found credible. There exists no rule of law mandating rejection of such evidence solely for want of independent corroboration. The evidence of the witnesses in the present case is reliable, admissible, and worthy of acceptance.
Satbir Singh and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2009) 13 SCC 790
The decision in Satbir Singh and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh is a significant pronouncement of the Supreme Court on the evidentiary value of related witnesses, the scope of Section 149 IPC, the interplay between medical and ocular evidence, and the non-compoundable nature of murder offences. The appellants had challenged the judgment of the Allahabad High Court affirming their conviction under Sections 302/149, 148, and 323/149 IPC. The trial court had sentenced them to life imprisonment for murder, and the High Court upheld the same. One of the accused died during pendency of proceedings.
Facts
The factual matrix reveals a long-standing family feud between two branches descending from a common ancestor. Previous litigation, including a murder case and preventive proceedings under Sections 107/117 CrPC, had aggravated hostility. On 27 November 1997, a dispute arose over cutting soil from a field ridge. The initial altercation escalated when the accused left the spot, returned armed with deadly weapons, and assaulted Jagbandhan, who died on the spot. An injured eyewitness, Mithan (PW-5), also sustained injuries. Thereafter, the accused proceeded to the village and murdered Randhir, who was chased and attacked near his residence. The FIR was lodged promptly at 1:15 PM, and the medical evidence established multiple ante-mortem injuries on both deceased persons, clearly confirming homicidal death.
Argument
One of the principal arguments raised by the defence was that the prosecution relied primarily on related witnesses and no independent villagers were examined. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, reiterating the settled principle that testimony of related or interested witnesses cannot be discarded merely on the ground of relationship. In cases involving family enmity, it is unrealistic to expect independent villagers to testify. What is required is careful scrutiny, not wholesale rejection. The Court found that the testimonies of PW-1 (informant), PW-5 (injured witness), PW-6, PW-4 (widow of Randhir), and PW-7 were consistent and trustworthy. Importantly, PW-5 was an injured witness, and the Court emphasized that the presence of an injured witness at the scene of occurrence stands on a higher evidentiary footing, as his presence is rarely doubtful.
The defence also argued that medical evidence contradicted ocular testimony. The post-mortem report showed semi-digested food in the stomach of one deceased, allegedly inconsistent with the prosecution timeline. The Court referred to earlier precedents, including Shivappa v. State of Karnataka and Main Pal v. State of Haryana, to reiterate that medical opinion is advisory in nature. Digestive processes depend on various physiological factors, and it is often impossible to determine the exact time of death solely on that basis. Unless medical evidence completely rules out the prosecution version, credible ocular testimony prevails. In the present case, the Court found no irreconcilable inconsistency.
Core issue
A central issue concerned applicability of Section 149 IPC. The defence contended that some accused had not committed specific overt acts and, therefore, common object was not proved. The Court rejected this argument. It observed that all accused returned armed with deadly weapons, participated in chasing and surrounding the deceased, and acted in concert. Even if individual roles were not attributed with precision, the collective conduct demonstrated a shared common object to commit murder. The Court clarified that in cases of group assault involving multiple armed persons, it is unrealistic to expect eyewitnesses to describe exact blows delivered by each accused. What is material is participation in an unlawful assembly with a common object. The Court held that the number and nature of injuries, particularly nineteen injuries on Randhir, established a coordinated attack. Thus, liability under Section 149 IPC was rightly invoked.
Observation and decision
The defence further challenged the delay in recording statements of certain witnesses by the Investigating Officer. The Court examined this contention in light of established jurisprudence, including Ranbir v. State of Punjab and Bodhraj v. State of J&K. It reiterated that delay in examination of witnesses is not ipso facto fatal. The explanation offered by the Investigating Officer must be considered. In the present case, the officer explained that he was occupied with preparing inquest reports and searching for the accused. The Court found the explanation plausible and held that no prejudice was demonstrated.
Another submission was that the inquest report did not mention names of the accused. The Court clarified that the purpose of an inquest under Section 174 CrPC is limited to ascertaining the apparent cause of death and describing injuries. It is not meant to identify assailants. Reliance was placed on Pedda Narayana v. State of A.P. and George v. State of Kerala, which authoritatively state that details of assailants fall outside the scope of inquest proceedings. Therefore, non-mention of accused names in the inquest report did not weaken the prosecution case.
One accused raised a plea of alibi, asserting that he was at a sugar mill encashing a payment on the date of occurrence. The Court reiterated that the burden to establish alibi lies squarely on the accused. The defence evidence was found insufficient and unreliable. Consequently, the plea failed.
An additional dimension of the case involved an application seeking recognition of a compromise between parties during pendency of appeal. The Supreme Court categorically rejected this attempt. It observed that offences under Section 302 IPC are non-compoundable under Sections 320 and 321 CrPC. Maintenance of rule of law is paramount. Private settlements cannot override statutory mandates in cases involving grave offences such as murder. The Court held that while parties may choose to live peacefully in future, such compromise cannot be a ground for acquittal in a case involving double homicide.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the convictions and sentences. The judgment consolidates important principles of criminal jurisprudence: credibility of related and injured witnesses; supremacy of trustworthy ocular evidence over inconclusive medical opinion; broad and purposive interpretation of Section 149 IPC; limited scope of inquest reports; and the non-compoundable character of murder. The decision thus serves as a robust reaffirmation of collective liability doctrine and evidentiary standards in cases of group assault arising from entrenched family enmity.
Related: Whether evidence of witness is admissible?
Right to object under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act: Land acquisition laws confer wide powers on the State, but such powers are circumscribed by statutory safeguards meant to protect landowners from arbitrary deprivation of property. In Hatam Singh and others v. State of U.P. and another, the Allahabad High Court undertook an exhaustive examination of the circumstances in which the State may invoke the urgency clause under Section 17 to dispense with this valuable right.
The judgment is significant for reiterating the limits of executive discretion and reinforcing constitutional fairness in compulsory acquisition proceedings.
Hatam Singh and others v. State of U.P. and another
The case arose out of notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for acquiring about 229 acres of land in Village Mohiuddinpur Kanawani, District Ghaziabad, for development of a residential colony under a planned development scheme by the Ghaziabad Development Authority. While issuing the Section 4 notification, the State invoked Section 17(4), thereby dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5-A, and subsequently invoked Section 17(1) to enable taking possession without waiting for an award. The landowners challenged the acquisition primarily on the ground that there was no real urgency justifying the denial of their statutory right to object.
Legal Issues for Consideration
The principal issue before the Court was whether the State Government had validly invoked the urgency provisions under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act so as to lawfully dispense with the inquiry under Section 5-A. Ancillary to this was the question of the scope of judicial review over the “subjective satisfaction” of the Government and the appropriate relief to be granted once such dispensation was found to be illegal.
Analysis and Findings of the Court
The Court reiterated that although the satisfaction of the Government under Section 17 is subjective, it is not immune from judicial scrutiny. The power to dispense with a Section 5-A inquiry is an exceptional power and can be exercised only when the urgency is of such a nature that even a short delay would frustrate the public purpose. Mere recital of urgency or assertion of public interest is insufficient; there must be relevant material demonstrating genuine urgency.
On facts, the Court found that the acquisition was for a residential housing scheme—an activity that ordinarily involves long-term planning, execution, and implementation. The record revealed that the scheme had been approved years before the issuance of the acquisition notifications and that there were unexplained delays of several years between approval of the scheme, issuance of the Section 4 notification, and publication of the Section 6 declaration. Such delays were inconsistent with the plea of urgency.
The Court further held that apprehension of unauthorized construction or encroachment, cited as a reason for invoking urgency, could not by itself justify dispensing with the Section 5-A inquiry. This was treated as a law-and-order issue rather than a ground constituting real urgency under the Act. The State’s failure to explore alternatives such as private negotiation, despite availability of uncultivated land, also indicated non-application of mind.
Consequently, the Court concluded that the formation of opinion by the State Government to invoke Section 17 suffered from a manifest error of law, rendering the dispensation of the Section 5-A inquiry illegal.
Relief and Moulding of Remedies
While holding the invocation of urgency to be invalid, the Court took note of the fact that acquisition proceedings had progressed substantially in respect of large portions of land, with development already carried out and third-party rights created. Balancing individual property rights with overarching public interest, the Court adopted a pragmatic approach. Instead of quashing the entire acquisition, it granted the authorities an option: they could retain the land by paying compensation determined in accordance with the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, taking 1 January 2014 as the relevant date. For land in respect of which this option was not exercised, the acquisition would stand quashed and the land would revert to the owners free from encumbrances.
The judgment in Hatam Singh serves as a detailed reaffirmation of the principle or right to object in respect of urgency clause under Section 17 is an exception, not the rule. It underscores that the right to object under Section 5-A is a substantive safeguard rooted in fairness and constitutional values, which cannot be taken away lightly or mechanically. At the same time, the Court’s nuanced approach to relief demonstrates judicial sensitivity to practical realities of urban development. The decision thus strikes a careful balance between protecting landowners’ rights and preserving legitimate public projects, making it an important precedent in land acquisition jurisprudence.
Also Read: Partial acquisition of house under the land acquisition Act 2013
Rejection of plaint on limitation: the question of limitation often becomes decisive in civil litigation, particularly in property disputes involving old and long-standing transactions. Courts are frequently called upon to balance the need to prevent stale claims with the equally important duty to ensure that genuine grievances, especially those involving allegations of fraud or concealment, are not shut out at the threshold.
In Mateswari Devi & Anr. v. Vidyakant Pandey & Ors. (AIR 2026 Allahabad 24), the Allahabad High Court examined the limits of the court’s power under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure and clarified when a plaint can—or cannot—be rejected on the ground of limitation. The judgment provides important guidance on the application of Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and reinforces the principle that issues involving delayed knowledge of a transaction ordinarily require adjudication on evidence rather than summary dismissal.
Mateswari Devi & Anr. v. Vidyakant Pandey & Ors. (AIR 2026 Allahabad 24)
In Mateswari Devi & Anr. v. Vidyakant Pandey & Ors. (AIR 2026 Allahabad 24), the Allahabad High Court examined the scope of rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground of limitation in a suit seeking cancellation of a sale deed executed nearly 25 years prior to the institution of the suit.
The plaintiff had specifically pleaded that he had no knowledge of the sale deed due to his old age and the absence of his children from the village, and that such knowledge was acquired only in April 2003 upon inspection of revenue records, whereafter the suit was promptly filed.
The Trial Court rejected the plaint holding the suit to be time-barred, branding the pleadings as clever drafting. However, the First Appellate Court set aside this order, holding that limitation in such cases is a mixed question of fact and law.
Court's Observation
High Court emphasized that under Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the period of limitation for cancellation of an instrument begins not from the date of execution but from the date when the facts entitling the plaintiff to seek such relief first become known to him, particularly in cases involving allegations of fraud or lack of knowledge. Since the plaint contained a clear assertion regarding the date and manner of acquiring knowledge, the issue of limitation required evidence and could not be decided summarily.
Upholding the decision of first appellate court, the High Court reiterated that while considering an application under Order VII Rule 11(d), the court must confine itself strictly to the averments in the plaint and cannot rely upon assertions made in the written statement or in the rejection application.
Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that rejection of the plaint at the threshold was legally unsustainable and reaffirming the principle that disputed questions relating to knowledge and limitation must ordinarily be tried on evidence rather than decided at the preliminary stage.
Order VII Rule 11 CPC
Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 empowers the civil court to reject a plaint at the threshold in specified situations, such as where the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, the relief is undervalued or insufficiently stamped and not corrected, or where the suit appears from the statements in the plaint itself to be barred by any law, including the law of limitation. While exercising this power, the court must confine itself strictly to the averments made in the plaint and cannot consider the defence taken in the written statement or any external material.
Rejection under Rule 11 is a drastic power and can be exercised only when the bar is apparent on a plain and meaningful reading of the plaint. If the issue—such as limitation—depends on disputed facts or requires evidence, the plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 and must proceed to trial.
Adopted child can claim share in the property of adoptive mother. My maternal grandmother’s (X) adopted son is claiming share in the joint family property of my maternal grandfather (Y). He was adopted by X after the death of her husband Y. At that point of time my mother and my mother’s sister were married. The X refused to live with my mother and adopted a son who was seven years old. Now X died and her adopted son has filed a partition suit and claiming 1/3 share in all properties of X. All those properties were inherited by X after the death of Y. Now my question is whether he has the right to claim share in the properties of X?
I have gathered some information on the internet and found that adopted son cannot claim share in the joint family property. That property was already devolved on my mother and her sister. Mrs X had not earned those properties she was just a care taker of that property. She had also no right to adopt a son when she already two daughters. All such things have done under the influence of my mama. He wanted to grab property of Y so he thoughtfully advised X to adopt a son.
Asked from: Uttar Pradesh
In the facts and circumstances stated, the adoption appears to be lawful, and the adopted son would be entitled to inherit the property of the adoptive mother. In the event of the death of X intestate, that is, without executing any testamentary instrument, the estate of the deceased shall devolve in accordance with the statutory rules of succession. Under the Hindu Succession Act, an adopted son is treated at par with a natural-born son for all purposes of inheritance and is, therefore, entitled to succeed to the property of the adoptive mother.
Accordingly, the property of deceased X would devolve equally upon her Class-I legal heirs, namely, the adopted son and her two daughters. Each legal heir would be entitled to an equal share, that is, one-third (1/3) each.
However, in the event the adoption is found to be illegal per se, or if the mandatory procedure prescribed for a valid adoption has not been duly complied with, the adopted child would acquire no right of inheritance. In such a situation, only the daughters of deceased X would inherit the property.
It is relevant to note that deceased X had no natural male issue and only daughters; therefore, she was legally competent to adopt a male child. Further, as her husband had predeceased her, it was not necessary for X to obtain the consent or permission of any person for adopting a son. Prima facie, therefore, the adoption appears to be valid in law.
With regard to the procedure of adoption, it is essential to verify whether the mandatory ceremony of “giving and taking” of the child was duly performed. Under Hindu law, a valid adoption requires that the child must be actually given in adoption by the biological parents or lawful guardian and taken by the adoptive parent. Such adoption may be effected either through the performance of customary ceremonies (adoption anushthan) or by execution of a valid adoption deed.
In the absence of proof of such ceremony or execution of an adoption deed, the person claiming adoption cannot be legally recognized as an adopted child and, consequently, would not be entitled to claim any share in the property of the adoptive mother.
Therefore, if the adoption is established to be legal and in conformity with the provisions of law, the adopted son acquires a vested right to succeed to the property of his deceased adoptive mother. It is immaterial that the said property was originally inherited by the adoptive mother from her husband, as upon inheritance it became her absolute property, capable of devolving upon her legal heirs in accordance with law.
Also read: Law regarding the adoption of child
SDM cannot attach property under section 146 crpc when a civil suit is pending before the civil court. I am the owner of a house which I purchased in 2020. After purchase of that flat one person namely Pawan came and claimed that the property belongs to him. I produced him sale deed and other documents like electricity connection, water tax receipts etc to prove that I am the owner of this flat. But he denied and continuously claimed that he is the owner. I saw his intention that he is trying to interfere in my property. I immediately filed a suit for declaration of title and injunction in the civil suit. After some time when he came to know that I have filed a civil suit and a copy of it was served on his address, he filed a case before the SDM under section 145 crpc and property was attached by the order of the SDM. Now the SDM is compelling me to vacate the house. I am very tense because the opposite party is trying to evict me from my own property. A revision application has been filed by me to the Commissioner.
Asked from: Bihar
The order passed by the SDM (Sub-Divisional Magistrate) appears to be erroneous and without jurisdiction. When a civil suit regarding the same property is pending before a competent civil court, the SDM has no authority to entertain the matter or pass any order under Sections 145 and 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC).
The SDM can interfere only when there is a likelihood of breach of peace arising from a dispute concerning immovable property, and even then, the applicant must be in possession of the disputed property. In this case, the applicant who moved the application under Section 145 CrPC is not in possession of the property. Therefore, the SDM had no legal power to pass an order under Section 145 CrPC.
Under such circumstances, a revision petition is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Since the proceeding arises under the provisions of the CrPC, the appropriate remedy is to file a petition before the High Court under Section 482 CrPC seeking to quash the SDM’s order.
In Amresh Tiwari v. Lalta Prasad Dubey, AIR 2000 SC 1504, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that when a civil suit concerning the same property is pending before the competent civil court, no order can be passed under Section 145 CrPC.
In light of the above judgment, the order passed by the SDM is liable to be quashed. Therefore, it is advisable not to press the revision petition and instead immediately file a petition before the High Court under Section 482 CrPC. SDM cannot attach property under section 146 crpc when civil suit is pending in the civil court.
Related: Executive magistrate passed order under section 145 crpc however dispute has decided by the civil court
क्या तलाक के लिये पति-पत्नी को अलग-अलग रहना जरूरी है। पिछले 23 वर्षों से हम एक साथ हैं लेकिन सिर्फ दिखावे के लिये पत्नी साथ नहीं रहना चाहती है। मैं दुबई में काम करता था और पिछले 11 साल से भारत मे रह रहा हूँ अपनी पत्नी के साथ। मेरे एक बेटी है जो राजस्थान में होस्टल में रह कर पढती है। मैं और मेरी पत्नी मेँ अभी बनती नहीं है। वो बहुत ज्यादा शंका करने वाली और बदमिजाज औरत है। मेरी एक और बेटी थी लेकिन वह ढाई साल की उम्र में ही मर गई थी क्योंकी मेरी पत्नी उसे बहुत पीटती थी। उस समय मैं दुबई में रहता था। इसलिये मैं कुछ नहीं कर पाया। मैं अब दूसरी शादी करना चाहता हूँ इसलिए मैं अपनी पत्नी से तलाक चाहता हूँ। मैंने बहुत मुश्किल से उसे म्यूचुयल तलाक के लिये मनाया हूँ। मैने एक वकील से सम्पर्क किया लेकिन उनका कहना है कि म्यूचुयल तलाक नहीं हो सकता क्योंकी मैं और मेरि पत्नी एक साथ रहते हैं। मेरी पत्नी अपने मायके नहीं रहना चाहती क्योंकि उसके माता-पिता अब इस दुनियां में नहीं हैं तथा वह अपने भाई के पास रहना नहीं चाहती हैं। क्या ऐसी स्थिति में मुझे तलाक नहीं मिल सकता है?
प्रश्न पूछा गया: हरियाणा से
हिंदू विवाह अधिनियम के धारा 13 बी के तहत आपसी सहमति से विवाह विच्छेद के लिये पक्षकारों (पति-पत्नी) को एक वर्ष या अधिक समय से अलग रहना चाहिए। यहाँ अलग या पृथक रहने का तात्पर्य पक्षकारों का पृथक स्थानों पर निवास करना नहीं है। यहाँ पृथक रहने का तात्पर्य वैवाहिक रिश्ता या दाम्पत्य जीवन के पृथकता से हैं। यदि विवाह के पक्षकार एक ही छत के नीचे निवास कर रहे हैं लेकिन उनके बीच दाम्पत्य रिश्ता या दाम्पत्य जीवन पूर्णतया समाप्त हो गया है तो विधि की दृष्टि में कहा जायेगा कि वे पृथक रह रहे हैं।
यदि वह पृथक्करण एक या एक से अधिक वर्षों से है तो वे हिंदू विवाह अधिनियम के धारा 13 बी के तहत आपसी सहमति से विवाह विच्छेद के लिये वाद दाखिल कर सकते हैं, यदि निम्नलिखित शर्तें पूरी हो रही हैं:
- विवाह के पक्षकारों का अब एक साथ रहना असंभव है। और
- विवाह के पक्षकारों ने विवाह को समाप्त करने के निर्णय कर लिया है।
माननीय सर्वोच्च न्यायालय ने सुरेष्ठा देवी बनाम ओम प्रकाश 1991 में निर्णीत किया है कि धारा 13 बी के तहत अलग रहने का तात्पर्य, पति-पत्नी का एक दूसरे के प्रति दाम्पत्य उत्तरदायित्व के पालन से खुद को पृथक कर लेना है। जब ऐसा पृथक्करण एक या अधिक वर्षों से है, उनका एक साथ रहना असंभव है और वें अपने विवाह को समाप्त करने के लिए सहमत हो गये हैं तो हिंदू विवाह अधिनियम के धारा 13 बी के तहत आपसी सहमति से विवाह विच्छेद के लिये आवश्यक सभी शर्तें पूरी हो जाती हैं।
अतः उपरोक्त निर्णय के क्रम में यदि आप के बीच आपसी सहमति से विवाह विच्छेद की राय बन जाती है तो हिंदू विवाह अधिनियम के धारा 13 बी के तहत आपसी सहमति से विवाह विच्छेद के लिये वाद दाखिल किया जा सकता है, चाहे आप पति-पत्नी एक ही छत के नीचे साथ-साथ निवास कर रहे हों।
संबन्धित: Enhancement of maintenance after mutual consent divorce
Can I produce pendrive at the advance stage of trial? I want to prove that the prosecutrix herself involved in sexual relations with me out of her free consent. In the trial the prosecution witness and a few defence witnesses have examined. At the later stage I wanted to produce a pendrive containing some videos and call recordings to prove that she also expressed her desire to have sex with me. We are studying in the same college and she is a junior to me. She wanted to establish physical relations hence, she made friendship and exchanged a lot of vulgar messages on whatsapp. However, I have no evidence to prove those vulgar messages because my mobile phone was lost. But during the sex she expressed some significant remarks to me and also showed fulfilment of her lust.
At several occasions she recognised those sexual activities and showed that she was very happy and wanted to do the same again. When my advocate submitted that pen drive in the court, it has been rejected that it cannot be admitted at this stage. Now my advocate wanted to challenge the order in high court. What would be the possibility of a proposed appeal?
Asked from: Uttar Pradesh
Upon perusal of the facts, it appears that the contents of the pen drive in question are materially relevant to your defence. If you are able to establish the authenticity and genuineness of the said evidence, it is likely to exonerate you from the alleged offence.
Section 294 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, permits both the prosecution and the defence to adduce documentary evidence without the necessity of formal proof, provided the genuineness of such documents is not disputed by the opposing party. Importantly, this provision can be invoked at any stage of the trial.
At this juncture, it is crucial to demonstrate that the proposed evidence is relevant and necessary for just adjudication. The trial court cannot summarily reject the application for production of additional evidence solely on the ground that it has been filed at an advanced stage of the proceedings. Such a rejection would amount to a misapplication of Section 294 CrPC.
In light of the above, you are advised to file a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC before the Hon’ble High Court, seeking quashing of the trial court’s order rejecting your application for bringing additional evidence on record.
Alternatively, if the trial is being conducted under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, you may prefer an appeal before the High Court under the appropriate provision of the said Act.
The impugned order of the trial court is prima facie unsustainable in law and is liable to be set aside for being in contravention of the provisions of Section 294 CrPC. You can produce pen drive even at the advance stage of trial.
Related:
Lessor has refused to renew the lease even after receiving entire rent in advance. I am running a small business in the city on a rental premises. The lessor has accepted the rent for this year but now sent a legal notice to vacate the premises because he has not renew the lease. In the lease agreement it has been mentioned that the written permission of lessor is mandatory for the renewal of rent. When the lease came to end I have deposited entire rent for this year in his bank account. After that he has sent a legal notice. The lessor wants to increase the rent or someone has approached him to let the premises on increased rent. I don't know what is the real intention behind serving legal notice. In the present scenario whether I have any legal remedy please suggest.
Asked from: Gujarat
You stated that written permission from the lessor (i.e., the owner) is mandatory for the renewal of the lease. It appears that remitting rent into the account of the landlord (i.e., the lessor) does not constitute a renewal of the lease. There is no automatic renewal of a lease. In the present scenario, you have very limited legal options. You cannot claim renewal of the lease merely on the basis that the entire rent has been deposited in advance.
When the lessor serves a legal notice to vacate the premises, it clearly indicates that he has no intention to renew the lease. According to Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, a lease of immovable property terminates by the efflux of time as specified in the agreement. Therefore, when the lease period expires, the owner (i.e., the lessor) has the right to repudiate or cancel the lease. The lessee cannot compel the lessor to renew the lease solely on the ground that the entire rent has already been remitted into his account.
Since you have been running a business on the premises, eviction is not possible merely on the basis of the notice. The lessor is obligated to provide you with sufficient time to vacate the premises. You may also negotiate with the landlord for additional time to find a suitable alternative location in the vicinity. In prevailing circumstance you cannot take a defense that lessor has refused to renew the lease even after receiving entire rent because lessor has exclusive right extend the lease.
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