What is the right of buyer to protect his possession if he took possession under agreement to sell? An agreement to sell is executed between the owner and purchaser. The owner does not want to obey the agreement and takes steps to evict me from the property. Entire deal was finalized in thirty-nine lakh rupees; five lakh rupees was given as advance and an agreement to sell that property was executed.
According to the terms of the agreement the buyer must pay the remaining amount within six months. When the buyer deposited the advance money in the bank account of seller, he has been put the buyer in possession of property.
Now I am living in the said property. After lapse of six months the seller has increased the property’s sale consideration. He is now demanding forty-five lakh rupees. Some dispute arose between us and finally I have told him that the sale will be concluded on the price agreed and mentioned in the agreement to sell.
Then seller lodged FIR against me and also file a suit for eviction. Police is continuously harassing me to leave the property. I am stuck in the untoward situation. What is the legal right of a person who has agreement to sell?
Asked from: Uttar Pradesh
In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the seller cannot, merely on the basis of the agreement to sell, forcibly dispossess you from the property. It is correct that under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, an agreement to sell does not by itself create any right, title or interest in favour of the proposed purchaser.
However, Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act protects a transferee who has taken possession of the property in part performance of a written agreement to sell and has performed, or is willing to perform, his part of the contract.
In the present case, there is a written agreement to sell; possession of the property was delivered to you pursuant to the said agreement; and you are ready and willing to pay the remaining sale consideration and complete the transaction.
Thus, the essential requirements for claiming protection under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act are prima facie satisfied.
Although such protection does not confer ownership or title upon you, it protects your possession against the seller and prevents the seller from taking back possession otherwise than in accordance with law.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rambhau Mandeo Gajare v. Narayan Bapuji Dhotra, (2004) 8 SCC 614, has held that the protection available under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act operates as a shield against dispossession. A transferor who has put the transferee in possession in pursuance of an agreement to sell cannot disturb such possession contrary to the protection available under Section 53-A.
It is, however, important to keep in mind that an agreement to sell, whether with possession or without possession is not a conveyance within the meaning of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act.
Therefore, you cannot claim ownership or title merely on the basis of said agreement. The right available is to protect possession and to seek enforcement of the contractual obligation through appropriate legal proceedings. You may also seek specific performance of the agreement and call upon the seller to execute the sale deed upon receipt of the balance sale consideration.
The aforesaid legal ground (part performance) constitutes a substantial defence to the eviction suit filed by the owner. Therefore, in that civil suit you can file an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC for rejection of plaint. If the plaint does not disclose a cause of action.
The defence based upon Section 53-A may also be considered by the court because possession was given in pursuance of the agreement to sell. In the prevailing circumstances you can also file a suit for specific performance, to compel the owner to receive the remaining sale amount and execute sale deed.
So far as the FIR is concerned, if the allegations in the FIR arise solely out of the contractual/property dispute and the ingredients of any cognizable offence are not disclosed. You can file a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking quashing of the FIR and consequential proceedings.
Where criminal proceedings are found to be an attempt to give a criminal colour to a purely civil dispute and the essential ingredients of the alleged offences are absent, the High Court may quash the FIR.
Also read: Eviction of old aged tenant
Can a Minor Be a Partner in a Firm? In a partnership firm a minor parter has been introduced on the contribution of his father. His father contributed some fund in the partnership firm and desired to introduce his minor son as parter with 25% share in profit and loss. Since his father was investor in firm and his interest needs to be protected then he has made partner. A partnership deed was duly registered. After the registration of firm it has been functioning well since 2023.
In 2025 one more partner was introduced and new deed was represented for registration of firm. After the reshuffling in firm, shareholders right in profit and loss was also decided. according to the fresh deed I have 60% share in profit & loss and remaining two are sharing 40% share with equal liabilities.
The firm took part in the tender invited by the Airport Authority of India and secure a technical bid. When the bid was considered for final allotment, the AAI has rejected our bid on the basis that partnership firm is invalid. We represented the AAI and sought some more time to remove the illegality. How to remove this illegality in the partnership firm?
Asked from: Maharashtra
As per the partnership deed executed for the formation of your firm, the minor was shown not merely as a person admitted to the benefits of the partnership, but as a partner having a 20% share in the profits as well as losses of the firm. This provision creates a serious legal defect in the constitution of the firm.
Section 30 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 specifically provides that a minor cannot be a partner in a firm. However, with the consent of all the existing partners, a minor may be admitted only to the benefits of partnership. The minor may be given an agreed share in the property and profits of the firm, but he cannot be treated as a full-fledged partner or be made personally liable for the acts and losses of the firm.
Therefore, if the partnership deed expressly describes the minor as a partner and makes him responsible for the losses of the firm in the same manner as the adult partner, the deed does not conform to Section 30 of the Partnership Act. The defect becomes more serious where the minor has been given the status and responsibilities of an adult partner and has been made liable for the firm’s losses.
The Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v. Dwarkadas Khetan & Co., AIR 1961 SC 680, held that a minor cannot enter into a contract of partnership and cannot be made a full-fledged partner. A partnership deed which expressly makes a minor a full partner is not a valid partnership deed for the purpose of registration. The defect cannot simply be cured by treating the minor as if he had originally been admitted only to the benefits of partnership.
In your case, the difficulty is even more significant because, from the beginning, the firm consisted of only two persons, one of whom was a minor. Since a minor cannot be a partner, there was, on the face of the deed, only one person capable of entering into the partnership contract. This raises a fundamental objection to the constitution of the firm itself.
For this reason, merely executing a subsequent clarification deed or rectification deed and submitting it to the Registrar of Firms may not satisfactorily cure the original defect. The Supreme Court’s decision in Dwarkadas Khetan makes it clear that an instrument which is fundamentally defective because it constitutes a minor as a full partner cannot simply be converted into a valid partnership deed by giving it a different interpretation.
It is important, however, to distinguish between a minor being made a full partner and a minor being admitted to the benefits of partnership. The latter is expressly permitted by Section 30. A minor may receive an agreed share in the property and profits of the firm, and his share may be affected by the acts of the firm, but he is not personally liable for those acts.
Accordingly, if the existing deed treats the minor as a full partner and imposes upon him the liabilities of an adult partner, the safer legal course would be to avoid relying upon a mere rectification deed and to consider constitution and registration of a fresh partnership firm in accordance with the Partnership Act, 1932.
The fresh partnership deed should clearly comply with Section 30. The adult partners should constitute the partnership, while the minor, if he is to be associated with the business, should be admitted only to the benefits of the partnership with the consent of all the partners. The deed should not confer upon the minor the status of a partner or impose personal liability upon him for the debts, obligations or losses of the firm.
Therefore, in the circumstances stated by you, obtaining a fresh registration, after properly restructuring the constitution of the firm and preparing a partnership deed compliant with Section 30, would be the more legally appropriate course rather than attempting to cure the original defect merely through a clarification or rectification deed.
A minor may be admitted only to the benefits of partnership
In simple terms, the minor can receive the benefit of the business, but he cannot be made responsible as a partner. He can have a share in profits and property, but he cannot be made personally liable for the firm’s debts and losses or be treated as an adult partner in the management of the firm.
However, giving the minor a share in the profits does not make him a partner. He continues to remain a minor who has only been admitted to the benefits of the partnership. He cannot be made personally responsible for the debts or liabilities of the firm in the same manner as an adult partner.
This distinction is particularly important in the case of losses. A minor cannot be made personally liable to contribute money towards the losses of the firm. His interest in the property of the firm may, of course, be affected because of the losses suffered by the firm, but the minor’s personal property cannot be used to recover the firm’s debts merely because he has been admitted to its benefits.
The minor is also entitled to inspect and take copies of the accounts of the firm. This right is given so that he can know what is happening to his financial interest in the firm. At the same time, he does not acquire the ordinary rights of an adult partner merely because he has a share in the profits.
Therefore, the expression “admitted to the benefits of partnership” essentially means that the minor can enjoy the financial benefits of the business without becoming a partner and without undertaking the personal liabilities of a partner.
Can bank be impleaded a party in the civil suit for cancellation of sale deed and declaration of title? I am an owner of agricultural land situated in district Sultanpur. For the last fifteen years I have been residing in Mumbai along with my family. Since I am not residing in my village, my neighbour has been cultivating that land for several years. Recently I came to know that he has taken loan upon my land and made a forged sale deed in his name. He mortgaged that land after obtaining declaration of land use as non-agricultural land under section 80 of The Uttar Pradesh Land Revenue Code. All the loan amount was utilized in his ice cream factory. When the fraud was revealed I immediately contacted him and inquired about the fact.
He is not giving answer of my questions. Then I go to my village and lodge FIR and filed a civil suit. In the civil suit bank is not made party. I told my lawyer to make branch manager as a party in the civil suit because he is also committed fraud. No inquiry was committed by the bank when loan was sanctioned over the land. My advocate moved application for impleading bank but court is not willing to allow my application because in the arguments court has the view that bank has not committed any fraud therefore, not a proper party. Whether bank is not a proper party? How to add him as defendant?
Asked from: Uttar Pradesh
In the present case, the defendant is alleged to have prepared a forged sale deed and, on the basis of the said document, obtained an order under Section 80 of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006. Thereafter, relying upon the forged sale deed, he claimed ownership over the property and mortgaged the same with the bank for obtaining a loan.
It appears that the defendant may have first changed the land use because obtaining a loan against agricultural land may not have been possible. It is also possible that the loan was obtained as a means to conceal the fraudulent transaction and that the loan amount was utilised in his ice-cream factory.
There is also a possibility that the defendant may deliberately default in repayment of the loan so that the property is declared an NPA and proceedings for recovery are initiated by the bank under the SARFAESI Act. In these circumstances, the bank is a necessary and proper party to the present civil suit.
However, it would not be advisable to allege that the bank itself has committed fraud. Such an allegation may adversely affect your application under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Instead, the case should be presented on the basis that the defendant, possibly in connivance with the bank, may deliberately default in repayment of the loan and thereby cause the account to be declared an NPA.
Also Read: Can I file a civil suit against the bank for instituting false proceedings before the DRT?
The Supreme Court in Central Bank of India v. Prabha Jain, (2025) 4 SCC 38, has held that the jurisdiction of the civil court over a dispute relating to ownership of the property is not completely excluded merely because proceedings under the SARFAESI Act are pending or may be initiated.
Civil court can examine the dispute concerning the validity of the sale deed and the ownership of the property. If the defendant defaults in repayment of the loan, the bank would be required to take appropriate steps under the SARFAESI Act for recovery of its dues.
Therefore, in order to protect the rights of all concerned parties and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, the bank should be impleaded as a defendant in the present suit.
It should also be brought to the notice of the court that, if the bank is not impleaded, the defendant may deliberately default in repayment of the loan and thereby cause proceedings under the SARFAESI Act to be initiated against the property. This may create a separate round of litigation between the plaintiff, the defendant and the bank, despite the fact that the ownership and validity of the sale deed are already directly in issue before the civil court.
Further, if the civil court ultimately cancels or declares the sale deed to be forged, illegal or void, such a judgment would directly affect the bank’s security interest in the property. The bank, therefore, has a direct and substantial interest in the subject matter of the suit. Its presence is necessary not only for effectively adjudicating the dispute but also for enabling the court to pass a complete and effective judgment.
Accordingly, the application under Order I Rule 10 CPC should be supported on the ground that the bank is both a necessary and proper party. Its impleadment would enable the court to effectively adjudicate the dispute, protect the plaintiff’s rights, safeguard the bank’s legitimate security interest, and avoid multiplicity of proceedings. On these grounds, there are substantial reasons for seeking impleadment of the bank in the present suit.
The husband is demanding a DNA test to check the paternity of our son without having any basis. There is a dispute between us to which my husband has thrown me and my son away from his home. In the last three years me and my parents have been trying to solve the issue but my husband is very much reluctant to adopt us. He is very arrogant and an officer in the forest department. When all attempts failed to amicably settle our dispute I filed divorce case in Bhopal. In the said divorce case my husband has alleged that I have an extra marital affair and the son is born out of that illegal affair. In that pretext he also applied to conduct a DNA test of our son to determine his paternity. I have opposed but the court has accepted his application and fixed a date in August 2026 for argument. My son is twelve years old and such a demand creates a doubt in the mind of my son about who his real father is. Please help.
Asked from: Madhya Pradesh
Your husband cannot compel you to undergo a DNA test or give a blood sample for a serological examination. The law is well settled on this issue. The Supreme Court, in Gautam Kundu v. State of West Bengal (1993) 3 SCC 418, held that:
No person can be compelled to give a blood sample for analysis. The Court also held that a DNA or blood test cannot be ordered as a matter of routine merely because one party makes such a request.
If a husband seeks a DNA test to dispute the paternity of a child, he must first establish a strong prima facie case by producing credible evidence. In particular, he must show that he had no access to his wife during the period when the child could have been conceived. In other words, he must prove that the husband and wife were not living together or had no opportunity for sexual relations during the relevant period.
Therefore, it is important to carefully examine the application filed by your husband. Unless he has specifically pleaded and supported with evidence that he had no access to you during the probable period of conception, the Court cannot ordinarily direct a DNA test.
This requirement is mandatory because Section 116 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (formerly Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872) creates a strong legal presumption that a child born during the subsistence of a valid marriage is the legitimate child of the husband.
This presumption can be displaced only by proving non-access between the spouses during the relevant period. The Supreme Court has reaffirmed this principle in Aparna Ajinkya Firodia v. Ajinkya Arun Firodia (2024) 7 SCC 773. The Court held that:
Where the husband and wife were living together during the period of conception, the legal presumption of legitimacy remains conclusive. Even if a DNA test were to indicate otherwise, the statutory presumption under the law would continue to operate.
More recently, in Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph, AIR 2025 SC 1004, the Supreme Court held that before directing a DNA test, the Court must first evaluate the evidence already available on record. Only if such evidence is insufficient to decide the issue should the Court consider ordering a DNA test.
Thus, the legal position is clear. A husband seeking a DNA test must first prove, through reliable evidence, that he had no access to his wife during the period when the child could have been conceived. Unless this essential requirement is satisfied, the Court should not direct a DNA test.
In your case, your son is now 12 years old. The present dispute appears to have arisen only because of matrimonial differences between you and your husband. During all these years, your husband never questioned the paternity of your son. Moreover, there is ample documentary evidence showing that he has consistently acknowledged himself as the father of the child.
In these circumstances, it is highly unlikely that the Court would allow your husband's request for a DNA test. In the absence of any pleading or evidence establishing non-access during the period of conception, his application is liable to be rejected.
Related: Can DNA testing decide paternity of a child?
क्या चेक बाउंस का केस मियाद समाप्त होने के बाद भी दाखिल हो सकता है? मैंने कुछ रूपया एक मित्र को उधार दिया था, जिसके बदले में उसने मुझे एक चेक दिया था कि समय पर यदि धन वापस नहीं कर पाया तो चेक बैंक में जमा कर देना। जिसके आधार पर उक्त धन मैंने दे दिया था। सात महीने बीतने के बाद भी उसने धन वापस नही किया तब मैंने एक विधिक नोटिस दिया जिसका कोई जवाब नहीं दिया गया। काफी समय बीत जाने के बाद भी मेरा मित्र धन वापस नहीं कर पा रहा था, उसके परेशानी को देखते हुए मैंने वह चेक वापस कर दिया तथा उसके बदले में छ: महीने का पोस्ट डेटेड चेक ले लिया कि कम से कम अगले छ: माह में तो वह धन वापस कर ही देगा। लेकिन समय बीत जाने के बाद भी उसने फूटी कौड़ी भी वापस नहीं किया। जिसके बाद मैंने वह चेक अपने खाते में भुनाने के लिए लगा दिया। वह चेक बाउंस हो गया जिसके बाद लीगल नोटिस दिया गया लेकिन उसने पैसा नही दिया। नोटिस समय सीमा समाप्त होने के बाद मैने परिवाद दाखिल किया लेकिन वह बारह दिनों के बाद दाखिल किया गया था। अब क्या मैं परिवाद दाखिल नहीं कर पाउँगा?
उत्तर प्रदेश
हाँ, परिवाद दाखिल करने के समय सीमा या मियाद समाप्त होने के बाद भी चेक बाउंस के अपराध में परिवाद दाखिल किया जा सकता है। परक्राम्य अधिनियम में चेक के अनादरण होने के बाद किस प्रकार परिवाद दाखिल किया जाएगा इसकी पूरी प्रक्रिया नियत है। धारा 142 में बताया गया है कि चेक बाउंस के मामले में न्यायालय द्वारा कब परिवाद पर अपराध का संज्ञान लिया जायेगा।
जब बैंक से चेक के अनादरण की सूचना प्राप्त होने के तीस दिनों के भीतर धन के मांग की सूचना चेक के लेखक (चेक जारी करने वाला) को दे दिया गया है, और इसकी सूचना प्राप्त होने के पंद्रह दिनों के भीतर उसने धन का भुगतान नहीं किया है तो ठीक पंद्रह दिन बीतने के बाद अपराध कारित हो जाता है तथा न्यायालय द्वारा परिवाद पर उसका संज्ञान लिया जाएगा।
धारा 142 परक्राम्य अधिनियम के अनुसार जिस दिन अपराध कारित किया गया है उस दिन से ठीक एक महीने के भीतर परिवाद दाखिल कर देना चाहिए। यदि परिवादी एक माह के भीतर परिवाद दाखिल करने में किसी सक्षम कारण से विरत रहा है तो न्यायालय एक माह का समय बीत जाने के बाद भी परिवाद स्वीकार कर सकता है। अर्थात जब परिवादी न्यायालय को संतुष्ट कर देता है कि वह किसी विधि-सम्मत कारण से एक माह के भीतर परिवाद दाखिल करने में असमर्थ रहा था तो मियाद बीत जाने के बाद भी न्यायालय परिवाद स्वीकार कर सकता है तथा अपराध का संज्ञान ले सकता है। यदि परिवादी द्वारा देरी का कोई विधिसम्मत आधार नहीं बताया जाता तो मियाद के बाद परिवाद स्वीकार नहीं किया जायेगा।
यदि आप न्यायालय को संतुष्ट कर पाते है कि किन कारणों से आप अपराध कारित होने के दिन से एक माह के भीतर परिवाद दाखिल नहीं कर पाए थे तो न्यायालय द्वारा परिवाद स्वीकार कर लिया जायेगा। लेकिन इसके लिए परिवाद के साथ एक पृथक प्रार्थना पत्र (application for condonation of delay) भी दिया जाएगा, जिसमें न्यायालय से अनुमति माँगा जाएगा कि वह विलम्ब को माफ करते हुए परिवाद दाखिल करने की अनुमति दे। जब न्यायालय द्वारा विलम्ब को माफ कर दिया जाता है तो परिवाद स्वीकार कर लिया जायेगा।
विलम्ब के समर्थन में यदि कोई दस्तावेजी साक्ष्य उपलब्ध है तो उसे न्यायालय के समक्ष विलम्ब माफी प्रार्थना पत्र के साथ बतौर साक्ष्य देना उचित रहेगा। न्यायालय द्वारा आसानी से विलम्बित परिवाद को स्वीकार किया जा सकता है। परिवाद दाखिल करने के मियाद समाप्त होने के बाद धारा 5 परिवाद अधिनियम के तहत प्रार्थना पत्र देने की आवश्यकता नहीं है, धारा 142 स्वतः न्यायालय को सक्षम बनाता है कि देरी का उचित कारण होने पर परिवाद स्वीकार किया जाये। उपरोक्त परिस्थितियों में आप मियाद समाप्त होने के बाद भी परिवाद दाखिल कर सकते हैं।
संबन्धित: कब न्यायालय द्वारा परिवाद को प्रीमैच्योर होने पर खारिज किया जायेगा
परक्राम्य लिखत अधिनियम की धारा 142 के तहत चेक बाउंस का मामला मियाद समाप्त होने के बाद भी दाखिल किया जा सकता है। सामान्यतः अपराध कारित होने के एक महीने के भीतर परिवाद देना अनिवार्य है। हालांकि, यदि परिवादी देरी का उचित और कानूनी कारण स्पष्ट कर सके, तो न्यायालय इसे स्वीकार कर सकता है।
विलंब होने पर परिवाद के साथ देरी माफी का आवेदन देना आवश्यक होता है। यदि न्यायालय आवेदक द्वारा बताए गए कारणों से संतुष्ट हो जाता है, तो वह समय सीमा बीतने के बावजूद मामले का संज्ञान ले सकता है। इसके लिए संबंधित साक्ष्य प्रस्तुत करना देरी माफी की प्रक्रिया को सुगम बनाता है।
Can appellate court determine the age of a juvenile after conviction by trial court? My brother has been convicted by the trial court for the offence of murder. The trial court has convicted and punished him with imprisonment for life. During the trial the advocate from our side produced evidence that the accused was juvenile at the time of commission of offence. That evidence was not entertained by the trial court. Now we are going to file an appeal and I want to know whether the appellate court can determine the age of my brother and acquit him from all charges?
Asked from: Uttar Pradesh
You have stated that the Trial Court did not entertain your claim of juvenility. However, from the facts narrated by you, it is not clear whether the Trial Court actually rejected your application for determination of age or whether it recorded a categorical finding that the accused was not a juvenile. The position, as presently described, appears somewhat ambiguous.
It is important to bear in mind that unless the Court has specifically determined the age of the accused and recorded a finding that he was above eighteen years of age on the date of commission of the offence, the issue of juvenility cannot be said to have been conclusively decided.
Under Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, read with Section 7A of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, whenever a plea of juvenility is raised before any Court or the Juvenile Justice Board, it becomes the bounden duty of the concerned Court or Board to conduct an inquiry and determine the age of the accused.
Rule 12 further prescribes the order of preference for determination of age. The Court is required to consider the following documents in sequence:
- Matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination board.
- In its absence, the date of birth certificate from the first school attended.
- If that is also unavailable, the birth certificate issued by the Municipal Authority or Panchayat.
- Only when none of the above documents are available, the age is to be determined through medical examination (bone ossification test) by a duly constituted Medical Board.
Further, Section 7A of the Juvenile Justice Act clearly provides that a claim of juvenility may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even after the disposal of the case. Consequently, the appellate court is fully empowered to examine such a claim and determine whether the accused was a juvenile at the time of the alleged offence.
In Sher Singh alias Sheru vs State of U.P. (2017), reported in 2017 Cri LJ 233, the Allahabad High Court held that the issue of juvenility can be raised before the appellate court where the Trial Court either failed to decide the claim or decided it incorrectly. The Court recognized the right of the accused to seek such determination even at the appellate stage.
Therefore, if the Trial Court has either not determined the age of the accused at all or has rejected the claim without properly following the statutory procedure, you are legally entitled to raise the plea of juvenility before the appellate court. There is no legal bar in doing so.
In fact, the appellate court is empowered to determine the age of a juvenile. it would be prudent to specifically raise this ground in the appeal. Let the appellate court come to the conclusion that the accused was a juvenile on the date of the alleged offence. The conviction recorded by the Trial Court would not sustain if appellate court finds that accused was juvenile at the time of commission of alleged offence.
Cancellation of bail when accused tempering with witnesses and also influencing the trial. There was a dispute between the two communities in regard to gaon sabha land. The upper caste has occupied land allotted to the victim's family in 1999. They are not willing to vacate the land therefore, a small group of villages moved a public interest litigation in the high court. In that PIL the high court directed the collector to submit a report within four weeks.
The collector vacated the land and also provided possession to the victim. After disposal of the PIL the other community assaulted and abused the victim. An FIR has been lodged against them under section 148/149/307 IPC and section 3(2) of SC ST Act. When the accused secured bail from the high court again threatening the victim. The court did not hear our voice. How to get cancellation of their bail.
Asked from: Bihar
In my considered opinion, it is a settled principle of law that once bail has been granted, it should not be cancelled in a routine or mechanical manner. Cancellation of bail is a serious matter and the higher court ordinarily interferes only when the order granting bail is found to be perverse, arbitrary, or passed without proper consideration of the relevant factors.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. (2004) 7 SCC 525 Neeru Yadav vs State of U.P. (2014) 16 SCC 508; Anil Kumar Yadav vs State NCT of Delhi (2018) 12 SCC 129; has observed that while granting bail the court must take into account certain important factors, such as:
- nature of the allegations against the accused,
- manner in which the offence is alleged to have been committed,
- gravity and seriousness of the offence,
- specific role attributed to the accused,
- criminal antecedents of the accused,
- likelihood of the accused influencing or tampering with witnesses.
Therefore, the first step is to carefully examine the bail order and see whether the court granting bail has considered these essential factors.
Another important aspect which requires examination is the compliance with the mandatory procedure provided under Section 15-A of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. This provision gives the victim a statutory right to be heard at the time of consideration of bail. The court granting bail is required to issue notice to the victim and provide an opportunity to participate in the bail proceedings.
If this mandatory procedure has not been followed, it can be a valid ground for seeking cancellation of bail. However, such a ground would generally arise where no notice of the bail proceedings was served upon the victim and the victim was deprived of the opportunity of being heard.
While considering an application for cancellation of bail, the appellate court may also take into account any subsequent circumstances that may have arisen after the grant of bail. The conduct of the accused after obtaining bail is also relevant, particularly if there are instances of threatening witnesses, attempting to influence them, or otherwise interfering with the course of justice.
In the circumstances mentioned by you, it would be advisable to approach the Hon’ble Supreme Court by filing an appropriate application for cancellation of bail. Since the victim belongs to a marginalized section of society and is socially weaker than the accused, any act of threatening or influencing witnesses may seriously affect the fairness of the trial. Such circumstances may constitute a reasonable ground for seeking cancellation of bail.
Related: Lapses in the investigation under SC/ST Act
Evidence of an interested witness is admissible or not in criminal proceedings. My husband is an accused in murder of his relative. There was some dispute regarding the property but he was not actually involved in the crime. He was present there but not participated in the crime. but he is arrayed as a prime offender. prosecution has produced only two witnesses in the case. One is the real son and another is an injured person.
The real son was not present at the scene but he later on reached there after coming to know about the offence. The witness deposed that there was a dispute between the accused and deceased, he immediately reached and saw that the accused were beating the deceased and hurling abuses, when I reached the accused flee. Due to injuries sustained by the deceased he died.
He deposed that both accused were beaten by the deceased. whereas my husband was only present there. please advise whether evidence of such an interested witness is reliable and admissible?
Asked from: Andhra Pradesh
It is a settled proposition of criminal jurisprudence that the testimony of a witness cannot be discarded merely on the ground that he is an interested witness. Rejection of evidence solely on this premise would amount to a failure of justice, as authoritatively held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Masalti v. State of U.P., AIR 1965 SC 202.
Ordinarily, an “interested witness” is understood to be one who has a direct or indirect stake in the outcome of the case. While close relatives of the victim—such as a son, daughter, husband, or wife—may be described as related witnesses, their presence at the scene of occurrence, particularly where the offence is committed within the confines of a house or private place, renders them natural witnesses. In such circumstances, their evidence cannot be discarded merely because of their relationship with the deceased.
In State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Rayappa and Others, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that it is a well-established principle of law that the testimony of a witness, if otherwise credible and trustworthy, cannot be rejected solely on the ground that he is related to the deceased and is, therefore, an interested witness.
In the present case, the son of the deceased cannot be termed an interested witness in the legal sense; he is a natural witness to the occurrence. The incident admittedly took place within the house of the deceased, and no independent person was present at the time of commission of the offence. A related witness does not ipso facto become an interested witness.
The distinction between a “related witness” and an “interested witness” has been lucidly explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Darya Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 328, wherein it was held that a related witness is not necessarily an interested witness. A witness can be said to be “interested” only when he or she derives some benefit from the outcome of the litigation—such as a decree in a civil suit or the conviction of an accused in a criminal trial.
Furthermore, in Satbir Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 2009 SC 2163, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it is not a sound principle of law that the prosecution case must fail merely because the witnesses examined are not independent. The absence of independent witnesses, by itself, is not a ground to discard otherwise reliable evidence.
It is now a well settled principle of law that only because the witnesses are not independent ones may not by itself be a ground to discard the prosecution case. If the prosecution case has been supported by the witnesses and no cogent reason has been shown to discredit their statements, a judgment of conviction can certainly be based thereupon.
In view of the aforesaid judicial pronouncements, it is evident that the testimony of related witnesses is legally admissible and can form the basis of conviction, provided it inspires confidence and is found credible. There exists no rule of law mandating rejection of such evidence solely for want of independent corroboration. The evidence of the witnesses in the present case is reliable, admissible, and worthy of acceptance.
Satbir Singh and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2009) 13 SCC 790
The decision in Satbir Singh and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh is a significant pronouncement of the Supreme Court on the evidentiary value of related witnesses, the scope of Section 149 IPC, the interplay between medical and ocular evidence, and the non-compoundable nature of murder offences. The appellants had challenged the judgment of the Allahabad High Court affirming their conviction under Sections 302/149, 148, and 323/149 IPC. The trial court had sentenced them to life imprisonment for murder, and the High Court upheld the same. One of the accused died during pendency of proceedings.
Facts
The factual matrix reveals a long-standing family feud between two branches descending from a common ancestor. Previous litigation, including a murder case and preventive proceedings under Sections 107/117 CrPC, had aggravated hostility. On 27 November 1997, a dispute arose over cutting soil from a field ridge. The initial altercation escalated when the accused left the spot, returned armed with deadly weapons, and assaulted Jagbandhan, who died on the spot. An injured eyewitness, Mithan (PW-5), also sustained injuries. Thereafter, the accused proceeded to the village and murdered Randhir, who was chased and attacked near his residence. The FIR was lodged promptly at 1:15 PM, and the medical evidence established multiple ante-mortem injuries on both deceased persons, clearly confirming homicidal death.
Argument
One of the principal arguments raised by the defence was that the prosecution relied primarily on related witnesses and no independent villagers were examined. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, reiterating the settled principle that testimony of related or interested witnesses cannot be discarded merely on the ground of relationship. In cases involving family enmity, it is unrealistic to expect independent villagers to testify. What is required is careful scrutiny, not wholesale rejection. The Court found that the testimonies of PW-1 (informant), PW-5 (injured witness), PW-6, PW-4 (widow of Randhir), and PW-7 were consistent and trustworthy. Importantly, PW-5 was an injured witness, and the Court emphasized that the presence of an injured witness at the scene of occurrence stands on a higher evidentiary footing, as his presence is rarely doubtful.
The defence also argued that medical evidence contradicted ocular testimony. The post-mortem report showed semi-digested food in the stomach of one deceased, allegedly inconsistent with the prosecution timeline. The Court referred to earlier precedents, including Shivappa v. State of Karnataka and Main Pal v. State of Haryana, to reiterate that medical opinion is advisory in nature. Digestive processes depend on various physiological factors, and it is often impossible to determine the exact time of death solely on that basis. Unless medical evidence completely rules out the prosecution version, credible ocular testimony prevails. In the present case, the Court found no irreconcilable inconsistency.
Core issue
A central issue concerned applicability of Section 149 IPC. The defence contended that some accused had not committed specific overt acts and, therefore, common object was not proved. The Court rejected this argument. It observed that all accused returned armed with deadly weapons, participated in chasing and surrounding the deceased, and acted in concert. Even if individual roles were not attributed with precision, the collective conduct demonstrated a shared common object to commit murder. The Court clarified that in cases of group assault involving multiple armed persons, it is unrealistic to expect eyewitnesses to describe exact blows delivered by each accused. What is material is participation in an unlawful assembly with a common object. The Court held that the number and nature of injuries, particularly nineteen injuries on Randhir, established a coordinated attack. Thus, liability under Section 149 IPC was rightly invoked.
Observation and decision
The defence further challenged the delay in recording statements of certain witnesses by the Investigating Officer. The Court examined this contention in light of established jurisprudence, including Ranbir v. State of Punjab and Bodhraj v. State of J&K. It reiterated that delay in examination of witnesses is not ipso facto fatal. The explanation offered by the Investigating Officer must be considered. In the present case, the officer explained that he was occupied with preparing inquest reports and searching for the accused. The Court found the explanation plausible and held that no prejudice was demonstrated.
Another submission was that the inquest report did not mention names of the accused. The Court clarified that the purpose of an inquest under Section 174 CrPC is limited to ascertaining the apparent cause of death and describing injuries. It is not meant to identify assailants. Reliance was placed on Pedda Narayana v. State of A.P. and George v. State of Kerala, which authoritatively state that details of assailants fall outside the scope of inquest proceedings. Therefore, non-mention of accused names in the inquest report did not weaken the prosecution case.
One accused raised a plea of alibi, asserting that he was at a sugar mill encashing a payment on the date of occurrence. The Court reiterated that the burden to establish alibi lies squarely on the accused. The defence evidence was found insufficient and unreliable. Consequently, the plea failed.
An additional dimension of the case involved an application seeking recognition of a compromise between parties during pendency of appeal. The Supreme Court categorically rejected this attempt. It observed that offences under Section 302 IPC are non-compoundable under Sections 320 and 321 CrPC. Maintenance of rule of law is paramount. Private settlements cannot override statutory mandates in cases involving grave offences such as murder. The Court held that while parties may choose to live peacefully in future, such compromise cannot be a ground for acquittal in a case involving double homicide.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the convictions and sentences. The judgment consolidates important principles of criminal jurisprudence: credibility of related and injured witnesses; supremacy of trustworthy ocular evidence over inconclusive medical opinion; broad and purposive interpretation of Section 149 IPC; limited scope of inquest reports; and the non-compoundable character of murder. The decision thus serves as a robust reaffirmation of collective liability doctrine and evidentiary standards in cases of group assault arising from entrenched family enmity.
Related: Whether evidence of witness is admissible?
