Rejection of plaint on limitation: the question of limitation often becomes decisive in civil litigation, particularly in property disputes involving old and long-standing transactions. Courts are frequently called upon to balance the need to prevent stale claims with the equally important duty to ensure that genuine grievances, especially those involving allegations of fraud or concealment, are not shut out at the threshold.
In Mateswari Devi & Anr. v. Vidyakant Pandey & Ors. (AIR 2026 Allahabad 24), the Allahabad High Court examined the limits of the court’s power under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure and clarified when a plaint can—or cannot—be rejected on the ground of limitation. The judgment provides important guidance on the application of Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and reinforces the principle that issues involving delayed knowledge of a transaction ordinarily require adjudication on evidence rather than summary dismissal.
Mateswari Devi & Anr. v. Vidyakant Pandey & Ors. (AIR 2026 Allahabad 24)
In Mateswari Devi & Anr. v. Vidyakant Pandey & Ors. (AIR 2026 Allahabad 24), the Allahabad High Court examined the scope of rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground of limitation in a suit seeking cancellation of a sale deed executed nearly 25 years prior to the institution of the suit.
The plaintiff had specifically pleaded that he had no knowledge of the sale deed due to his old age and the absence of his children from the village, and that such knowledge was acquired only in April 2003 upon inspection of revenue records, whereafter the suit was promptly filed.
The Trial Court rejected the plaint holding the suit to be time-barred, branding the pleadings as clever drafting. However, the First Appellate Court set aside this order, holding that limitation in such cases is a mixed question of fact and law.
Court's Observation
High Court emphasized that under Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the period of limitation for cancellation of an instrument begins not from the date of execution but from the date when the facts entitling the plaintiff to seek such relief first become known to him, particularly in cases involving allegations of fraud or lack of knowledge. Since the plaint contained a clear assertion regarding the date and manner of acquiring knowledge, the issue of limitation required evidence and could not be decided summarily.
Upholding the decision of first appellate court, the High Court reiterated that while considering an application under Order VII Rule 11(d), the court must confine itself strictly to the averments in the plaint and cannot rely upon assertions made in the written statement or in the rejection application.
Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that rejection of the plaint at the threshold was legally unsustainable and reaffirming the principle that disputed questions relating to knowledge and limitation must ordinarily be tried on evidence rather than decided at the preliminary stage.
Order VII Rule 11 CPC
Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 empowers the civil court to reject a plaint at the threshold in specified situations, such as where the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, the relief is undervalued or insufficiently stamped and not corrected, or where the suit appears from the statements in the plaint itself to be barred by any law, including the law of limitation. While exercising this power, the court must confine itself strictly to the averments made in the plaint and cannot consider the defence taken in the written statement or any external material.
Rejection under Rule 11 is a drastic power and can be exercised only when the bar is apparent on a plain and meaningful reading of the plaint. If the issue—such as limitation—depends on disputed facts or requires evidence, the plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 and must proceed to trial.