Right to object under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act: Land acquisition laws confer wide powers on the State, but such powers are circumscribed by statutory safeguards meant to protect landowners from arbitrary deprivation of property. In Hatam Singh and others v. State of U.P. and another, the Allahabad High Court undertook an exhaustive examination of the circumstances in which the State may invoke the urgency clause under Section 17 to dispense with this valuable right.
The judgment is significant for reiterating the limits of executive discretion and reinforcing constitutional fairness in compulsory acquisition proceedings.
Hatam Singh and others v. State of U.P. and another
The case arose out of notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for acquiring about 229 acres of land in Village Mohiuddinpur Kanawani, District Ghaziabad, for development of a residential colony under a planned development scheme by the Ghaziabad Development Authority. While issuing the Section 4 notification, the State invoked Section 17(4), thereby dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5-A, and subsequently invoked Section 17(1) to enable taking possession without waiting for an award. The landowners challenged the acquisition primarily on the ground that there was no real urgency justifying the denial of their statutory right to object.
Legal Issues for Consideration
The principal issue before the Court was whether the State Government had validly invoked the urgency provisions under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act so as to lawfully dispense with the inquiry under Section 5-A. Ancillary to this was the question of the scope of judicial review over the “subjective satisfaction” of the Government and the appropriate relief to be granted once such dispensation was found to be illegal.
Analysis and Findings of the Court
The Court reiterated that although the satisfaction of the Government under Section 17 is subjective, it is not immune from judicial scrutiny. The power to dispense with a Section 5-A inquiry is an exceptional power and can be exercised only when the urgency is of such a nature that even a short delay would frustrate the public purpose. Mere recital of urgency or assertion of public interest is insufficient; there must be relevant material demonstrating genuine urgency.
On facts, the Court found that the acquisition was for a residential housing scheme—an activity that ordinarily involves long-term planning, execution, and implementation. The record revealed that the scheme had been approved years before the issuance of the acquisition notifications and that there were unexplained delays of several years between approval of the scheme, issuance of the Section 4 notification, and publication of the Section 6 declaration. Such delays were inconsistent with the plea of urgency.
The Court further held that apprehension of unauthorized construction or encroachment, cited as a reason for invoking urgency, could not by itself justify dispensing with the Section 5-A inquiry. This was treated as a law-and-order issue rather than a ground constituting real urgency under the Act. The State’s failure to explore alternatives such as private negotiation, despite availability of uncultivated land, also indicated non-application of mind.
Consequently, the Court concluded that the formation of opinion by the State Government to invoke Section 17 suffered from a manifest error of law, rendering the dispensation of the Section 5-A inquiry illegal.
Relief and Moulding of Remedies
While holding the invocation of urgency to be invalid, the Court took note of the fact that acquisition proceedings had progressed substantially in respect of large portions of land, with development already carried out and third-party rights created. Balancing individual property rights with overarching public interest, the Court adopted a pragmatic approach. Instead of quashing the entire acquisition, it granted the authorities an option: they could retain the land by paying compensation determined in accordance with the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, taking 1 January 2014 as the relevant date. For land in respect of which this option was not exercised, the acquisition would stand quashed and the land would revert to the owners free from encumbrances.
The judgment in Hatam Singh serves as a detailed reaffirmation of the principle or right to object in respect of urgency clause under Section 17 is an exception, not the rule. It underscores that the right to object under Section 5-A is a substantive safeguard rooted in fairness and constitutional values, which cannot be taken away lightly or mechanically. At the same time, the Court’s nuanced approach to relief demonstrates judicial sensitivity to practical realities of urban development. The decision thus strikes a careful balance between protecting landowners’ rights and preserving legitimate public projects, making it an important precedent in land acquisition jurisprudence.
Also Read: Partial acquisition of house under the land acquisition Act 2013